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Abstract—We introduce a new perspective into the field of
quantitative information flow (QIF) analysis that invites the
community to bound the leakage, reported by QIF quantifiers,
by a range consistent with the size of a program’s secret input
instead of by a mathematically sound (but counter-intuitive) upper
bound of that leakage. To substantiate our position, we present a
refinement of a recent QIF metric that appears in the literature.
Our refinement is based on slight changes we bring into the design
of that metric. These changes do not affect the theoretical premises
onto which the original metric is laid. However, they enable the
natural association between flow results and the exhaustive search
effort needed to uncover a program’s secret information (or the
residual secret part of that information) to be clearly established.
The refinement we discuss in this paper validates our perspective
and demonstrates its importance in the future design of QIF
quantifiers.
Index Terms—computer security, quantitative information flow,
information theory, uncertainty, inference, program analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of information flow analysis is to enforce limits
on the use of information that apply to all computations that
involve that information. For instance, a confidentiality property
requires that a program with secret inputs should not leak
those inputs into its public outputs. Qualitative information flow
properties, such as non-interference are expensive, impossible,
or rarely satisfied by real programs: generally some flow exists,
and many systems remain secure provided that the amount
of flow is sufficiently small, moreover, designers wish to
distinguish acceptable from unacceptable flows.
Systems often reveal a summary of secret information they
store. The summary contains fewer bits and provides a limit
on the attacker’s inference. For instance, a patient’s report is
released with the disease name covered by a black rectangle.
However, it is not easy to precisely determine how much
information exists in the summary. For instance, if the font
size is uniform on the patient’s report, the width of the black
rectangle might determine the length of the disease name.
Quantitative information flow (QIF) analysis is an approach
that establishes bounds on information that is leaked by a
program. In QIF, confidentiality properties are also expressed,
but as limits on the number of bits that might be revealed from
a program’s execution. A violation is declared if the number
of leaked bits exceeds the policy. Because information theory
forms the foundation of QIF analysis, it should be possible
to associate the quantities reported by QIF quantifiers with
the effort needed to uncover secret information via exhaustive
search. However, establishing this association is infeasible with
QIF quantifiers that do not report a flow consistent with the
size of a program’s secret input, but instead a mathematically
sound upper bound of that flow [1]. For instance, consider
the QIF metric and the password checker in Section 1 of [1],
and assume that the password space has a cardinality of 3.
This means that the size of the password is log 3 = 1.5849
bits. (Here and hereafter, all logarithms are to the base 2).
Nonetheless, the metric in [1] might report a flow that exceeds
1.5849 bits, which makes it impossible to determine the space
of the exhaustive search that should be carried out in order to
reveal the residual secret part of the password. However, if the
flow reported is always less than 1.5849 bits, the exhaustive
search space becomes evident.
We believe that the counter-intuitive flow quantities reported
by some QIF quantifiers, that appear in the literature, are due
to a flaw in the design of those quantifiers, and that simple
tweaks can bound those quantities by a range consistent with
the size of a program’s secret input. This paper takes the first
step in this direction and refines the QIF metric suggested in
[1]. The metric in [1] is based on a new perspective for QIF
analysis. The fundamental idea is to model an attacker’s belief
about a program’s secret input as a probability distribution over
high states. This belief is then revised, using Bayesian updating
techniques, as the attacker interacts with a program’s execution.
It is believed that the work reported in [1] is the first to address
an attacker’s belief in quantifying information flow. This work
was later expanded and appeared in [2]. A number of relevant
results [3], [4] were reported in the sequel; however, the work
in [1], [2] is sufficient as a foundation of our work.
A. Plan of the Paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II elaborates on accuracy-based information flow analysis
which is the major contribution in [1]. In this section, we
give concise elucidation of the elements of this analysis and
how it differs from the classical uncertainty-based information
flow analysis. In addition, we uncover some inexplicable results
reported by the QIF metric in [1], and argue that the reasoning
of this metric’s designers is incomplete. We further state the
general range of flow reported by the metric in [1] that applies
to both deterministic and probabilistic programs as well as
to all types of attacker’s beliefs. This range is neither given
in [1] nor in [2]. Over the course of acquiring the range,
we reveal the ineffectiveness of the admissibility restriction
suggested in [1]. At the end of Section II, we conjecture a
simple fix that can bound the results reported by the metric
in [1]. Underpinning our arguments in Section II is a formal
definition of a size-consistent QIF quantifier. Our definition
is based on uncertainty-based information flow analysis, and
it inaugurates the new perspective we are introducing into
the field of QIF. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first definition to capture the correlation between the size
of a program’s secret input and the quantification of flow
from that input in the general case. Section III concentrates
on Kullback-Leibler divergence which is a centerpiece of the
metric in [1]. We give some mathematical interpretations of
this divergence, and then focus on its discrimination construct,
suggesting the replacement of this construct with a better
one, and subsequently the replacement of the divergence itself
with another, bounded, divergence. This paves the way for
the refinement of the metric in [1] which is what we fulfill
in two stages in Section IV. We also give the range and the
interpretation of the refined metric, and prove its properties
and their meaningfulness compared to the original one, while
minding the consistency of the probability distributions dealt
with. Having justified the conjecture we made in Section II,
and shown that a large number of possible refinements of the
metric in [1] exist, we discuss the association of the original and
the refined metric with the exhaustive search effort in Section
V, give some remarks in Section VI, and conclude the paper
in Section VII. The proofs are given in Appendix I.
II. UNCERTAINTY- VS. ACCURACY-BASED INFORMATION
FLOW ANALYSIS
The problem with uncertainty-based information flow analy-
sis is that it ignores reality. As an example, consider a simple
password checker PWC [1] that sets an authentication flag a
after checking a stored password p against a guessed password
g supplied by the user.
PWC : if p = g then a := 1 else a := 0 (1)
For simplicity, suppose that the password space is Wp =
{A,B,C}, which gives a size of log |Wp| = log 3 = 1.5849
bits for the password p. Suppose further that the user is
actually an attacker attempting to discover the password. Before
interacting with a PWC execution, this attacker believes that
the password is overwhelmingly likely to be A but has a very
small and equally likely chance to be either B or C. More
concretely and adopting the convention in [1], the attacker’s
prebelief about p is captured using a probability distribution
bH :Wp → [0, 1] as shown in Table Ia.
p A B C
bH 0.98 0.01 0.01
(a) Attacker’s prebelief
p A B C
b
′
H
0 0.5 0.5
(b) Attacker’s postbelief
TABLE I: Attacker’s beliefs in the password p
The attacker’s uncertainty about p (not necessarily about
the correct p) is obtained via a simple application of Shannon
uncertainty functional [5]:
U = S(bH) = −0.98 log 0.98− 2 · 0.01 log 0.01 = 0.1614 bits
Assuming that the correct password (the reality) is C, if the
attacker complies to her prebelief and feeds a PWC execution
with g = A, she will observe a equal to 0. The attacker then
infers that A is not the real password, and that there is an equal
chance of 50% that the password is either B or C. As a result,
the attacker’s postbelief distributes as shown in Table Ib, and
the attacker’s uncertainty about p becomes:
U = S(b
′
H) = −0.5 log 0.5− 0.5 log 0.5 = 1 bit
To complete an uncertainty-based information flow analysis,
we have to compute the reduction in uncertainty by subtracting
the post- from the pre-uncertainty using the formula:
R = U − U ′
This gives us R = 0.1614 − 1 = −0.8386 bits. In the
sense of uncertainty-based analysis, the negative R means
absence of information flow. There is nothing wrong with this
interpretation provided that we do not connect information flow
with how far an attacker’s belief is from reality. However, if
we connect the flow with the distance between an attacker’s
belief and reality, then the interpretation that R supports does
not make sense. The measure R ignores reality by measuring
bH and b
′
H against each other only, instead of against the high
state (which is C as the correct password in our example). It
is good to notice however that the range of flow reported by
R is as given by the formula:
̺R = [− log |Wp|, log |Wp|] = [−1.5849, 1.5849]
This is a direct consequence of Shannon uncertainty func-
tional falling in the range [0, log |Wp|] [6]. The range ̺R
reported by R is plausible if we remember that the size of the
password p is 1.5849 bits. We would like to take time defining
the size-consistent QIF quantifier.
Definition 1 (Size-consistent QIF Quantifier): We say that a
QIF quantifier is size-consistent if its reported results are
bounded (from above and from below) by the size of a pro-
gram’s secret input. Formally, let QUAN be a QIF quantifier,
and assume that the size of a program’s secret input is η bits.
We say that QUAN is size-consistent if:
QUANmax ≤ η and QUANmin ≥ −η
However, if we merely look at the attacker’s prebelief and
postbelief in C, as the correct password, we realize that the
attacker’s belief has approached reality from interacting with
PWC. Approaching reality cannot happen unless the attacker
learns something from an amount of information PWC has
conveyed. This conveyance corresponds to positive informa-
tion flow that informs the attacker, and flatly contradicts the
uncertainty-based interpretation.
The earliest investigation of this specific inadequacy of
uncertainty-based information flow analysis appeared in [1] and
was later expanded in [2]. The authors of [2] propose to respect
reality through what they call ”accuracy-based information flow
analysis”. This sort of analysis has two elements:
E1. Quantifying information flow from a program’s execution
to an attacker.
E2. Respecting the distance between an attacker’s belief and
reality.
The uncertainty-based analysis does not have the second el-
ement as the example above demonstrated. The accuracy-based
analysis quantifies flow as the improvement in the accuracy of
an attacker’s belief. This is equivalent to saying the reduction
in the distance between an attacker’s belief and reality. The
metric advanced in [2] is based on this notion of improvement,
and is given by the formula:
Q(E , b
′
H) = D(bH → σ˙H)−D(b
′
H → σ˙H) (2)
where E = 〈S, bH , σH , σL〉 is an experiment tuple as defined
in [2], 〈E , b′H〉 is the outcome of that experiment, bH is the
attacker’s prebelief, b′H is the attacker’s postbelief, σ˙H is a
probability distribution that maps the high state σH to 1 (this
is the certainty about the high state; about reality), and D is
Kullback-Leibler divergence (also known as relative entropy or
information gain [6]) given by the formula:
D(b→ b′) =
∑
σ∈Wp
b′(σ) · log
b′(σ)
b(σ)
(3)
Notice in formula (2) how Q respects reality by measuring
bH and b
′
H against the correct high state σ˙H , instead of against
each other only. Formula (2) is simplified in [2] to (this
simplification is reality-aware):
Q(E , b
′
H) = D(bH → σ˙H)−D(b
′
H → σ˙H)
=
∑
σ∈Wp
σ˙H(σ) · log
σ˙H(σ)
bH(σ)
−
∑
σ∈Wp
σ˙H(σ) · log
σ˙H (σ)
b
′
H
(σ)
= − log bH(σH) + log b
′
H(σH)
(4)
To complete an accuracy-based information flow analysis
parallel to the uncertainty-based analysis we have completed
earlier in this section, we apply formula (4) to the same example
given above to obtain:
Q(E , b
′
H) = − log 0.01 + log 0.5 = 5.6438 bits (5)
The flow value of 5.6438 bits reported by Q violates the
plausible range ̺R = [−1.5849, 1.5849] and equally exceeds
the size needed to store the password p. How can a flow from
p exceed the size needed to store p? A sound but puzzling
result in the field of QIF analysis that the authors of [2]
attribute to that the attacker’s prebelief is not uniform; it is
more erroneous than a uniform belief ascribing 1/3 probability
to each password A, B, and C, and therefore a larger amount
of information is required to correct it! But what can the source
of this larger amount of information be? Is it a covert agent
external to the system and the attacker when all the agents are
assumed condensed to just the attacker and the system [2]?
Besides is it always true that a uniform attacker’s prebelief
would, in a series of experiments, cause her to learn a total of
log 3 bits [2]? This claim is valid for a deterministic password
checker, but incomplete for a probabilistic one. Let us verify
this fact.
It is proved in [2] that for deterministic programs (including
the deterministic PWC given in formula (1)), we have:
bH(σH) ≤ b
′
H(σH) (6)
Since b′H is a probability distribution, we can write:
bH(σH) ≤ b
′
H(σH) ≤ 1
which means:
log bH(σH) ≤ log b
′
H(σH) ≤ 0
0 ≤ Q ≤ − log bH(σH)
The attacker’s prebelief is assumed uniform on Wp, therefore:
0 ≤ Q ≤ log 3
Thus, it is beyond a shadow of a doubt that a uniform
attacker’s prebelief would cause her to learn a total of log 3
bits from interacting with a deterministic PWC. But does
the attacker’s learning outcome differ when interacting with
a probabilistic PWC? An illustrative probabilistic PWC is:
PPWC : if p = g then a := 1 0.99 8 a := 0
else a := 0 0.99 8 a := 1
The inequality in formula (6) no longer holds, and we are
free to write:
0 ≤ b
′
H(σH) ≤ 1
−∞ ≤ − log bH(σH) + log b
′
H(σH) ≤ − log bH(σH)
−∞ ≤ Q ≤ 0 or 0 ≤ Q ≤ log 3
The sub-range −∞ ≤ Q ≤ 0 shows that a uniform attacker’s
prebelief might cause her to learn an infinite number of misin-
forming bits from interacting with PPWC. This demonstrates
the incompleteness of the claim ”a uniform attacker’s prebelief
would, in a series of experiments, cause her to learn a total of
log 3 bits” made in [2].
The previous discussion motivates the investigation of the
general range of the Q metric that holds with both deterministic
and probabilistic programs as well as with all types of attacker’s
beliefs. This range is attained in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: Considering both deterministic and probabilistic
programs, and all types of an attacker’s beliefs, the general
range of flow reported by Q is:
̺Q = (−∞,− log bH(σH)]
Clearly Q is not size-consistent. Let us now muse on the
computation in formula (5) and try to figure out a mean to
proceed with this correspondence. The flow of 5.6438 bits has
brought the attacker from − log 0.01 = 6.6438 bits away from
reality to − log 0.5 = 1 bits away from it. In addition and as
proved in Theorem 3 in [2], each bit of flow has made the
attacker twice as likely to guess correctly [7], or equivalently
twice as certain about the correct high state (in total, we have
25.6438 ≈ 50 times increase in the likelihood of a correct guess).
In the uncertainty-based definition, the attacker’s certainty is
ascribed to a high state that might be incorrect...Conjecture 1
engrossedly stops the correspondence.
Conjecture 1: Considering Theorem 3 in [2], if a bit of flow
makes the attacker more than twice as likely to guess correctly,
then Q should become size-consistent.
Seeking a justification for this conjecture will be the purpose
of the later sections. Although the authors of [1], [2] are
acclaimed for their contribution to the field of QIF through
their accuracy-based analysis, their metric allows the respect
for reality (element E2) to attenuate the quality of flow quan-
tification (element E1). This attenuation is the result of severe
discrimination in Kullback-Leibler divergence as we shall see
in the next section.
III. CONCENTRATING ON KULLBACK-LEIBLER
DIVERGENCE
A. Possible Interpretations of the Divergence
The divergence D between b and b′, given in formula (3),
can be interpreted in terms of code inefficiency as follows; D is
the average number of bits that are wasted by encoding events
from a distribution b′ with a code based on a not-quite-right
distribution b [8]. Another way of writing D in terms of the
expected value function [9] is as follows:
D(b→ b′) = Eb′(log
b′(σ)
b(σ)
), Eb′(f) =
∑
σ∈Wp
b′(σ) · f(σ)
The function Eb′ takes the weighted average of the values
f(σ) in which the weights are probabilities b′. In the original
paper by Kullback and Leibler [10], the values:
IDis(σ) = log
b′(σ)
b(σ)
(7)
are seen as the information in σ for the discrimination between
b and b′. This is plausible if we rewrite the previous values as:
− log b(σ)− (− log b′(σ))
and recall that the information contained in an observation of
an event E with probability p(E) is − log p(E) [6].
This notion of discrimination leads to another interpretation
of D; it is the weighted average of the information in σ for
the discrimination between b and b′ where the weights are
probabilities b′. We write:
D(b→ b′) = Eb′(IDis(σ)) (8)
B. A Better Discrimination Construct
We propose to replace the discrimination construct in formula
(8) with the following:
I
′
Dis(σ) = log
b′(σ)
b′(σ)+b(σ)
2
(9)
for I ′Dis(σ) to be the information in σ for the discrimination
between the mean (b′ + b)/2 and b′. But what is the effect of
this replacement? The following lemma shows that we have
actually cut down the discrimination at least by half.
Lemma 2: The proposed discrimination construct cuts down
the discrimination in Kullback-Leibler divergence at least by
half, that is: I ′Dis(σ) ≤ 12IDis(σ).
A graphical comparison between IDis(σ) and I
′
Dis(σ) is
shown in Figure 1a. It is important to notice at this stage that
halving the infinite value of IDis(σ) does not make it finite.
C. A Better Divergence
Substituting (9) for (7) in (8), we get the divergence:
D′(b→ b′) =
∑
σ∈Wp
b′(σ) · log
b′(σ)
b′(σ)+b(σ)
2
(10)
The resulted divergence meets with the asymmetric form
K of Jensen-Shannon divergence proposed in [11]. In fact,
formula (9) and Lemma 2 both appear in [11] wrapped in the
expected value function. D′ is nonnegative and equals zero if
and only if b = b′ [11]. This is essential for any measure of
difference and justifies using D′ instead of D to measure the
distance between two beliefs. A possible interpretation of D′
is as follows; how much information is lost if we describe the
two random variables that correspond to b and b′ with their
average distribution (b′ + b)/2? This interpretation gives D′
the nickname ”information radius” [8].
A graphical comparison between D and D′ is shown in
Figure 1b. Notice that D approaches infinity when t approaches
0 or 1. In contrast, D′ is always well defined in the entire range
t ∈ [0, 1]. This is because (b′ + b)/2 6= 0 if either b′ = 0 or
b = 0. But what is the effect of using D′ instead of D in Q?
This will be our focus in the next section.
IV. REFINING THE METRIC
A. Refining to Normalization
If we substitute (10) for (3) in (2), we get the metric:
Q′(E , b
′
H) = D
′(bH → σ˙H)−D′(b
′
H → σ˙H)
=
∑
σ∈Wp
σ˙H(σ) · log
σ˙H (σ)
σ˙H (σ)+bH (σ)
2
−
∑
σ∈Wp
σ˙H(σ) · log
σ˙H (σ)
σ˙H (σ)+b
′
H
(σ)
2
= − log(1 + bH(σH)) + log(1 + b
′
H(σH))
Notice that the above substitution does not destroy the
bedrock of accuracy-based analysis which, as mention in Sec-
tion II, quantifies flow as the improvement in the accuracy of
an attacker’s belief. This guarantees that Q′ is a real metric
of information flow. Before proceeding any further, we need to
investigate the general range of Q′, which is what we do in
Lemma 3.
Lemma 3: Considering both deterministic and probabilistic
programs, and all types of an attacker’s beliefs, and avoiding
the imposition of any admissibility restriction on those beliefs,
the general range of flow reported by Q′ is:
̺Q′ = [−1, 1]
Fortunately, the sub-range [−1, 0] corresponds to the at-
tacker’s misinformation while the sub-range [0, 1] corresponds
to the attacker’s information about the correct high state.
The new range ̺Q′ = [−1, 1], we have reached, does
not make Q′ size-consistent. Nonetheless, ̺Q′ is a plausible
normalization (flow percentage) that is invariant with respect
to the choice of the measurement unit.
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Fig. 1: Graphical comparisons made in the paper
B. Refining to Actuality
To ensure bits as the measurement unit, and avoid the need
to transform the flow results back and forth between the ranges
̺Q′ = [−1, 1] and ̺R = [−1.5849, 1.5849], we let η be the
size of a program’s secret input in bits, and define the refined
metric as:
Q′′(E , b
′
H) = η · Q
′(E , b
′
H)
= η · [− log(1 + bH(σH)) + log(1 + b
′
H(σH))](11)
A graphical comparison between Q and Q′′ in the case of
PWC, along with the size-consistent uncertainty-based upper
and lower bounds of flow, is shown in Figure 1c. It is important
to notice in this figure that the parts of the Q and Q′′ graphs
that fall above the zero mark on the Y axis represent the
attacker’s information about the correct high state. In contrast,
the attacker’s misinformation is represented by the parts that
fall below the zero mark on the Y axis. Another important
observation to make in this figure is that, akin to Q, Q′′ is
sensitive to changes in the attacker’s belief. It is thus noted
that Q′′ is a good quantifier of flow (element E1) that adheres
well to reality (element E2).
C. Range of the Refined Metric
The most celebrated property of the refined metric is prob-
ably its range which is sought in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: Considering both deterministic and probabilistic
programs, and all types of an attacker’s beliefs, and avoiding
the imposition of any admissibility restriction on those beliefs,
the general range of flow reported by Q′′ is:
̺Q′′ = [−η · log(1 + bH(σH)), η · [1− log(1 + bH(σH))]]
where η is the size of a program’s secret input in bits.
Corollary 1: Notice that log(1 + bH(σH)) ≤ 1. This means
thatQ′′max ≤ η and Q
′′
min ≥ −η, and makesQ′′ size-consistent.
D. Interpreting the Refined Metric
If we apply formula (11) to the same example given in
Section II, we get:
Q′′(E , b
′
H) = 0.9044 bits
This time, the flow of 0.9044 bits has brought the attacker
from
1.5849 · [1− log(1 + 0.01)] = 1.5621 bits
away from reality to
1.5849 · [1− log(1 + 0.5)] = 0.6577 bits
away from it. But how much did this flow make the attacker
likely to guess correctly? Theorem 2 answers this question,
substantiating the validity of Conjecture 1 we made in Section
II, and showing that a bit of flow reported by Q′′ makes the
attacker more than twice as likely to guess correctly.
Theorem 2: A flow of k bits reported by Q′′ makes the
attacker more than 2k as likely to guess correctly. Strictly
speaking:
Q′′(E , b
′
H) = k⇔ b
′
H(σH) = 2
k/η · bH(σH) + 2
k/η − 1 (12)
where η is the size of a program’s secret input in bits.
E. Consistency of the Probability Distributions
The bounds of Q′′, given in Theorem 1, ensure proper
bounds of b′H . This can be easily shown by assuming a flow
of k bits and proceeding as follows:
−η · log(1 + bH(σH)) ≤ k ≤ η · [1− log(1 + bH(σH))]
2
log( 1
1+bH (σH )
)
· (1 + bH(σH))− 1 ≤ b
′
H(σH)
≤ 2
log( 2
1+bH (σH )
)
· (1 + bH(σH))− 1
0 ≤ b
′
H(σH) ≤ 1
However, this does not ensure that an intermediate value of
Q′′ leads to b′H falling outside the range [0, 1]. To ensure this,
we need to show that Q′′ is a monotone function. This is done
in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4: Q′′ is a monotonically increasing function, that
is:
∀b1, b2 : b1 ≤ b2 ⇒ Q
′′(E , b1) ≤ Q
′′(E , b2)
Thus, the probability distributions dealt with are invariably
consistent.
F. Meaningfulness of the Bounds
We still have to accentuate the meaningfulness of the bounds
of Q′′ in relation to the attacker’s likelihood of a correct guess,
or equivalently, to the attacker’s certainty about the correct high
state. This is done in Theorems 3 and 4.
Theorem 3: An informing flow equal to the upper bound of
Q′′ is sufficient to make a fully uncertain attacker fully certain
about the correct high state.
Corollary 2: Notice that, in the case of a fully uncertain
attacker, we have:
Q
′′
min(E , b
′
H) = −η · log(1 + bH(σH)) = −η · log 1 = 0
This yields the absolute range ̺Q′′ = [0, η] for Q′′, and
reflects the rationality that a fully uncertain attacker can only
be informed.
Theorem 4: A misinforming flow equal to the lower bound
of Q′′ is sufficient to make a fully certain attacker fully
uncertain about the correct high state.
A similar corollary to Corollary 2 can be stated to show that
a fully certain attacker can only be misinformed.
G. Other Refinements
The discrimination construct, given in formula (9), which
we used in our refinement is definitely not the only apt
construct. Any construct that reduces the discrimination is a
likely candidate for the replacement of the Kullback-Leibler
construct (given in formula (7)). For instance, consider the
following discrimination construct:
I
′′
Dis(σ) = log
1 + b′(σ)
1 + b(σ)
This construct clearly cuts down the discrimination. More-
over, it leads to the same refinement that the construct in (9)
had led to. This shows that there is a large number of possible
refinements of the Q metric. However, we favored the construct
in (9) since the properties of Jensen-Shannon divergence are
well-examined in the literature [11].
V. EXHAUSTIVE SEARCH EFFORT
Assuming a program with a secret input of size η bits, and an
informing flow of k bits from the same program to an attacker.
The dynamic upper bound of Q′′, given in Theorem 1, tells
us that k ≤ η. Therefore, the space of the exhaustive search
[12] that should be carried out in order to reveal the residual
part η − k bits of the secret input is 2η−k. On the other hand,
the dynamic upper bound of Q, given in Lemma 1, tells us
that k > η is a possible scenario. In scenarios as such, the
residual part of the secret input is impossible to determine, and
consequently, the exhaustive search space cannot be established,
albeit that the secret input might have been partially revealed
to the attacker (refer to the example in Section II).
VI. REMARKS
In addition to the divergence K , given in formula (10),
Lin [11] identified two other divergence measures. The first
divergence is denoted as J , and is given by the formula:
J(b→ b′) =
∑
σ∈Wp
(b′(σ)− b(σ)) · log
b′(σ)
b(σ)
This divergence is the symmetric form of Kullback-Leibler
divergence, given in formula (3), and they both share the same
problems; they are unbounded from above and undefined if
b(σ) = 0 and b′(σ) 6= 0 for any σ ∈ Wp. It is therefore doubtful
that the use of any of these two divergence measures would lead
to size-consistent QIF quantifiers. The second divergence Lin
identified is denoted as L, and is given by the formula:
L(b→ b′) = 2S(
b+ b′
2
)− S(b)− S(b′)
where S is Shannon uncertainty functional [5]. This divergence
is the symmetric form of the divergence K we used in our
refinement. It has an obvious information-theoretic interpreta-
tion in terms of Shannon uncertainty functional which makes it
suitable for use in accuracy-based information flow analysis
when an attacker’s belief about a program’s secret input is
modeled using advanced representations of uncertainty other
than a simple probability distribution over high states. We leave
the investigation of this use as future work.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a refinement of the QIF metric in [1], [2]
that bounds its reported results by a plausible range. Both the
original and the refined metric are justified quantifiers of the
flow that occurred during a program’s execution. However, they
differ in their interpretation of one bit of flow. Contrary to the
original metric, the results reported by the refined metric are
easily associated with the exhaustive search effort needed to
uncover a program’s secret information (or the residual secret
part of that information). We believe that the counter-intuitive
flow quantities reported by some QIF quantifiers, that appear in
the literature, are due to a flaw in the design of those quantifiers.
We further believe that this can be avoided by introducing minor
changes into the design of those quantifiers.
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APPENDIX I
PROOFS
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Kullback-Leibler divergence given in formula (3) has the range:
0 ≤ D(b→ b′) ≤ +∞
which means that:
−∞ ≤ D(bH → σ˙H)−D(b′H → σ˙H) ≤ +∞
−∞ ≤ Q ≤ +∞
It could be safer to bring the reader around by showing the ex-
treme cases. The extreme case from above Q = +∞ is reached
when bH(σH) = 0 and b
′
H(σH) = 1, whereas the converse
yields the extreme case from below Q = −∞. An admissibility
restriction is suggested in [1] on the attacker’s prebelief. This
restriction ensures that the prebelief never deviates by more
than a positive factor from a uniform distribution, and is given
by the formula:
minσH (bH(σH)) ≥ ǫ ·
1
|StateH |
; ǫ > 0
The restriction above more or less excludes the attacker’s initial
belief that certain states are impossible, or in other words,
ascribing zero as a prebelief. However, it does not impose
anything on the attacker’s postbelief, which enables us to write:
0 < bH(σH)) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ b
′
H(σH) ≤ 1
and consequently:
−∞ ≤ D(bH → σ˙H)−D(b′H → σ˙H) < +∞
−∞ ≤ Q < +∞
Notice how the admissibility restriction is weak in that it
averts reporting infinite informing flow from the metric Q,
while leaving the rest of the counter-intuitive results unattended
(perhaps this explains why the admissibility restriction is given
in the original work [1], but not in the expanded one [2]). We
have yet to arrive at the general range of Q. The last word on
this matter relates to the fact that the attacker’s postbelief about
the correct high state can neither be better than full certainty nor
worse than full uncertainty. The former of these two arguments
yields the dynamic upper bound of Q which corresponds to the
maximum informing flow:
Qmax(E , b
′
H) = − log bH(σH) + log 1 = − log bH(σH)
whereas the latter of the two arguments yields the absolute
lower bound of Q which corresponds to the maximum misin-
forming flow:
Qmin(E , b
′
H) = − log bH(σH) + log 0 = −∞
This gives us the general range of flow reported by Q:
̺Q = (−∞,− log bH(σH)]
B. Proof of Lemma 2
The inequality of the arithmetic and geometric means gives us:
b′(σ) + b(σ)
2
≥
√
b′(σ) · b(σ)
Based on this, we can write:
I
′
Dis(σ) = log
b′(σ)
b′(σ)+b(σ)
2
≤ log
b′(σ)√
b′(σ) · b(σ)
=
1
2
IDis(σ)
C. Proof of Lemma 3
The divergence D′ shown in formula (10) has the range [11]:
0 ≤ D′(b→ b′) ≤ 1
which means that:
−1 ≤ D′(bH → σ˙H)−D
′(b′H → σ˙H) ≤ 1
̺Q′ = [−1, 1]
D. Proof of Theorem 1
Borrowing the same two arguments we used in the proof of
Lemma 1, we obtain the dynamic upper bound of Q′′ which
corresponds to the maximum informing flow:
Q
′′
max(E , b
′
H) = η · [1− log(1 + bH(σH))]
and the dynamic lower bound of Q′′ which corresponds to the
maximum misinforming flow:
Q
′′
min(E , b
′
H) = −η · log(1 + bH(σH))
This gives us the general range of flow reported by Q:
̺Q′′ = [−η · log(1 + bH(σH)), η · [1− log(1 + bH(σH))]]
E. Proof of Theorem 2
Assuming a flow of k bits gives us:
Q′′(E , b
′
H) = k
η · [− log(1 + bH(σH)) + log(1 + b
′
H(σH))] = k
b
′
H(σH) = 2
k/η · bH(σH) + 2
k/η − 1
F. Proof of Lemma 4
b1 ≤ b2
− log(1 + b) + log(1 + b1) ≤ − log(1 + b) + log(1 + b2)
Q′′(E , b1) ≤ Q′′(E , b2)
G. Proof of Theorem 3
A fully uncertain attacker about the correct high state has a
zero prebelief. An informing flow equal to the upper bound of
Q′′:
Q
′′
max(E , b
′
H) = η · [1− log(1+ bH(σH))] = η · [1− log1] = η
evolutes the attacker’s knowledge, and transforms her prebelief
into the following postbelief:
b
′
H(σH) = 2
k/η · bH(σH) + 2
k/η − 1 = 2η/η − 1 = 1
This postbelief captures the attacker’s full certainty about the
correct high state.
H. Proof of Theorem 4
The proof is essentially the same as the proof of Theorem 3,
although it starts by a fully certain attacker about the correct
high state.
